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NEW NEPA PROBLEMS IN JOINT
FEDERAL-STATE PROJECTS: DOES A STATE'S
ISSUANCE OF A NATIONAL
POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION
SYSTEM PERMIT REQUIRE AN
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT?
The National Environmental Policy Act requires that an environmental impact
statement be preparedfor every "major federal action that signfflcantly affects the
quality of the human environment. " Exactly when an activity constitutes such a
"major federal action" has been a continuing problem with regard to programs
which include activityfrom both state and/federal levels. Recently, a United States
District Court has ruled that an environmental impact statement is not required when
a state issues a discharge permit in conjunction with the National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System, a nation wide program mandated by the Federal Water
Pollution ControlAct. This Note analyzes the law regarding NEPA and its relation
to joint federal-state projects and to environmental regulatory activities and exam-
ines the federal or state character of state-issued permits through a study of the
legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and its amendments.
The author concludes that the law surrounding the question of whether such issu-
ances require an environmental impact statement is ambiguous and argues that, due
to the pervasive policies expressed by Congress in NEPA, any ambiguity should
properly be resolved infavor offindings which will more adequatelyprotect the envi-
ronment, i e., that state issuances of such permits should require an impact state-
ment.
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* The Plain Dealer, January 6, 1979, at 19-C; © 1979 by Jefferson Communications,
Inc. and reprinted by permission of the Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc.
Cf. Wall St. J., June 13, 1979, at 20, col. 1 ("Q: Why does it take five Americans to change
a light bulb? A: One to turn the bulb and four to file the environmental impact state-
ment.").
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INTRODUCTION
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 (NEPA)'
is the seminal piece of legislation of the modem environmental
movement.' NEPA established a national policy that environ-
mental concerns be recognized in governmental decisionmaking; 3
it furthered this policy by requiring that federal agencies prepare
environmental impact statements (EIS) for "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."4
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
2. NEPA brought about "fundamental reform on all levels of the federal deci-
sion-making process .... [I]t undeniably has made giant strides toward revitalization of
the bureaucratic processes that have for so long neglected environmental values." Ander-
son, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 239 (E.
Dolgin & T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
3. The Act contained a "Congressional declaration of national environmental pol-
icy" which stated that:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound
influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion,
resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recog-
nizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the
continuing policy of the federal government, in cooperation with state and local
governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all
practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and main-
tain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
4. Id § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), which provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall ....
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
The environmental impact statement is the "heart of NEPA." W. RODGERS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 7.4, at 725 (1977). It serves several functions. Not only is the EIS an
"alarm bell" for environmental concerns, id at 726, but it also serves as a verification of
the "genuineness of the decisionmaking process." Id at 730. The statement is designed
for three audiences: the public; other government entities with applicable expertise or
power over environmental issues; and other persons within the issuing agency. Id at 726.
The impact statement must "'include the results of the [agency's] own investigation
1979]
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What constitutes a "major federal action," and thus requires
an EIS, has been a recurring issue. Resolution of this issue has
involved three separate inquiries: (1) what activities constitute
"action" within the statutory framework; (2) how large or impor-
tant must the subject matter of the action be to be "major" and
"significantly affect" the environment; and (3) what kind and ex-
tent of federal participation is necessary for the action to be "fed-
eral."5 This Note does not specifically address the first two tests;
6
rather, it focuses on the last test-the meaning of "federal"-in
the context of joint state and federal activities.
In determining the requisite degree of federal nexus, judges
and commentators have developed several tests,7 including:
whether the project required substantial planning, time, and re-
and evaluation of alternatives so that the reasons for the choice of a course of action are
clear'; should 'explicate fully [the agency's] course of inquiry, its analysis and its reason-
ing;' and must 'go beyond mere assertions and indicate its basis for them.'" Id at 730
(footnotes omitted). The statement should also show who was consulted, what the con-
sulted party said, and the preparing agency's response, if any. Id
Most importantly, the EIS provides a substantive vehicle for judicial review of chal-
lenged governmental activities. It not only provides documentation of possible violations
of environmental quality standards, but also may be shown to be inadequate itself. For
example:
Environmental impact statements found inadequate by the courts customarily
display serious lapses of disclosure and reasoned decisions. Thus, prominent in-
dicia of a defective EIS include conclusions that are sweepingly vague, unsup-
ported in fact, scientifically indefensible, wholly unquantified, unexplained in
comprehensible terms, internally contradictory, basically flawed, obviously mis-
leading or incomplete, excessively cryptic or perfunctory, argumentative, genu-
inely preposterous, dependent upon stale data or biased procedures, ignore
important topics, delete telling information, exude arrogance, callousness or
whimsy unresponsive to expert criticism, or demonstrate a reluctant, begrudging
compliance.
Id at 731-33 (footnotes omitted). The remedy for an inadequate EIS is typically an in-
junction to preserve the status quo. Id at 799.
5. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 56-141 (1973). EIS preparation has
been required in a broad range of activities or actions including detonating nuclear war-
heads, leasing submerged lands for oil development, canceling a national program to
purchase irreplaceable helium, spraying colonies of fire ants with insecticide pursuant to a
nine-state program, granting federal construction monies for building prison facilities in an
historic area of Virginia, clearing oxygen-consuming vegetation from 55 miles of a river,
issuing a construction permit for a pulp mill on National Forest land, granting HUD con-
struction loans, constructing an incinerator at a federal hospital, opening a branch bank
with the approval of the comptroller of the currency; and ICC suspending rail freight rates
and thereby allowing surcharges to be imposed on shipments of recyclable metal scrap. Id
at 76-78.
6. For a discussion of these tests, see F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 56-141.
7. See generally Comment, Environmental Law-National Environmental Policy
Act-Procedural Requirements Applicable to the Threshold Agency Determination that an
Environmental Impact Statement is Not Required; Testsfor Actions Constituting "Major
Federal Action Signiflcantly Affecting the Quality of the Human Environment," Rucker v.
Willis, 484 F2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973), 26 S.C. L. REV. 119 (1974).
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sources;8 whether the federal government reserved significant dis-
cretionary powers; 9 whether there was substantial federal
funding; t  and whether the project required federal approval or
license."t Defining the requisite degree of federal nexus is partic-
ularly difficult in cases involving joint federal and state activities
since the actual role or involvement of the federal government
may be somewhat obfuscated. Thus, the question of whether an
EIS is required in joint federal and state projects has spawned
numerous cases.'
2
One especially troublesome situation involves the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) mandated by
section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972.'1 This program involves issuing water pollution
discharge permits to point discharges."4 The Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the power to man-
age the program and issue such permits.'5 However, consistent
with the congressional policy to decentralize environmental pro-
tection efforts,' 6 states may also issue NPDES permits, after ob-
taining EPA approval of a state permit program. '7 Even after
approval, however, EPA retains overall review power.' 8 Thus, the
question arises whether a state's issuance of an NPDES per-
8. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356,
366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (EIS required for a 66-mile stream channelization project con-
ducted by the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture).
9. Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1973) (EIS required for construction
of a housing project to be financed by HUD grants).
10. Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 1974) (despite state rejection of federal
funds to build a state penal hospital, EIS required because diversion of federal funds to
other state penal system projects indicated the entire action was federal).
11. See Scientists' Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088-89
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (EIS required for the issuance of an AEC permit to construct a nuclear
power plant); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (approval by the Secre-
tary of Interior of leases of Indian lands requires an EIS); Izaac Walton League of Am. v.
Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C. 1971) (EIS required for the issuance of AEC
nuclear power construction and operating license). See also notes 61-75 infra and accom-
panying text.
12. See generally Brown, Applying NEP4 to Joint Federal and Non-Federal Projects, 4
ENVT'L AFF. 135 (1975).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
14. A point discharge is a discharge which originates from a specific source, such as
an industrial plant, a municipal sewage treatment plant, or an agricultural feedlot. Zener,
The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 2, at 682, 683.
15. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)
(1976).
16. Id § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
17. Id § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
18. Id § 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).
1979]
670 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:666
mit-an action taken by a state agency, yet done in conjunction
with a federal program-is a major federal action requiring EIS
preparation.19
There are several distinctions between issuances of NPDES
permits and other joint federal and state projects that have re-
ceived judicial scrutiny. First, most prior NEPA cases have in-
volved federal funding, a factor not present in NPDES
programs. 20  Second, the joint federal-state project cases involve
an analysis of an individual case as opposed to the determination
of the generic issue of federal action involved in the class of cases
19. The only reported case decided prior to 1979 on the issue of NEPA applicability
to state-issued NPDES permits is Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State Water
Control Bd., 453 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1978). Chesapeake arose when two environmental
citizens' groups challenged the issuance of a discharge permit by Virginia's State Water
Control Board (the Board) to Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC). The Board's
NPDES program had been approved by EPA in 1973. HREC sought to build a petroleum
refinery that would discharge processing wastes into Chesapeake Bay. HREC had filed an
application for a new source discharge permit on October 19, 1976. Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6 [here-
inafter cited as Plaintiffs Memorandum].
EPA had some involvement in the HREC permit proceeding. It agreed to vary the
permit review procedure, waiving its right to review and comment on the proposed permit
prior to publication of a draft but reserving the right to comment at the permit hearing and
to object thereafter. Id at 7. EPA tendered technical assistance, responding to HREC
requests for information on refinery treatment processes. Id EPA informally suggested
several permit changes before the draft permit was published, and EPA representatives
testified at the permit hearing. Id EPA subsequently informed the Board that it would not
object to the permit. Id at 8.
20. A majority of those cases defining "federal action" in joint federal-state projects
have involved state construction of highways in conjunction with the Federal Works and
Highways Administration's Interstate Highway Construction Program. (It is not surprising
that most joint federal-state project cases have involved highways since this program is the
most prolific federal public works program.) The most liberal courts have found "federal
actions" to exist under circumstances in which the federal involvement was extremely re-
mote. Specifically, state highway construction has been held to be federal action merely
because of Federal Works and Highways Administration approval, notwithstanding the
subsequent rejection of federal funds by the state. Named Individuals of the San Antonio
Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1027 (5th Cir. 1971). Reasons
for such a finding are twofold. First, courts have found (and commentators have noted)
that through voluntary compliance with federal standards in order to gain federal funding
approval, states have voluntarily submitted themselves to federal jurisdiction and thus
must adhere to federal environmental requirements. E.g., id See generally Lynch, Com-
plying with NEPA: The Tortuous Path to an Adequate Environmental Impact Statement, 14
ARIz. L. REv. 717 (1972); Note, Federal Courts-To Enforce Federal Environmental Laws, a
Federal Court Can Declare a State Highway Project to be "Federal" and Enjoin the State
From Proceeding on Its Own, 50 TEX. L. REv. 381 (1972). Second, courts have held that
the federal highway program, in particular a state's application process, is so imbued with
federal participation because of federal approval at various project stages and substantial
"interim" federal funding that a state's rejection of final funding is irrelevant. Eg., Scotts-
dale Mall v. Indiana, 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977).
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of all state-issued NPDES permits.2" Third, issuances of NPDES
permits constitute environmental regulatory activities, 22 and, with
respect to NEPA, such activities receive different treatment than
other joint federal-state projects.23 Furthermore, the question of
NEPA's applicability to state-issued NPDES permits is distin-
guishable from other NEPA cases involving environmental regu-
21. Cases involving joint federal and state projects are distinguishable from those
concerning state-issued NPDES permits because of the nature of the inquiry involved.
For example, the main question in the highway cases is when, in the continuum of a state
highway planning and construction program, does the federal government's participation
make the program a federal action. Brown, supra note 12, at 138. In such cases, the fed-
eral action designation follows initiation of state action. In contrast, with NPDES permits,
EPA approval and other review powers must be present prior to any issuance by the state.
Therefore, if approval or other related federal activities make state NPDES permit issu-
ances federal actions, such designation would precede initiation of state activity. Thus, the
difference in the inquiry is one between finding the federal-state character of each individ-
ual project in the highway context and finding per se or generic federal-state character in
the permit context.
Cases not involving highway projects have adopted both broad and narrow definitions
of federal actions. Some courts have found federal action where there was only slight
federal involvement. E.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (federal action
found for issuance of a "no strings" block grant under the Law Enforcement Administra-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3733 (1976)). Other courts have developed more conservative tests
which have emphasized the degree of federal involvement, giving meaning to "majo?" in
"major federal action." Under the "final decision" test, Ze., when a federal agency makes
the final decision regarding the project, the action becomes a federal action. City of Boston
v. Brinegar, 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1961 (D. Mass. 1974). According to the "partnership
nexus" test, £e., there is federal action when a partnership exists between state and federal
governments. E.g., Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 289-90 (1st Cir. 1973). In addition,
these courts have usually shunned broad application of any test and insisted upon federal
action analysis on a case-by-case basis as in the highway cases. E.g., Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358, 1366 (3rd Cir.
1972). See also Brown, supra note 12, at 138-40.
22. There have been many cases involving federal licenses, permits and other envi-
ronmental regulatory activities. E.g., Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973) (no
EIS necessary for construction permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers); Scientists'
Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (EIS required for
AEC permit for construction of a nuclear plant); and Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I
(D.D.C. 1971) (EIS required for Corps of Engineers discharge permits issued pursuant to
the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976)). For a discussion of federal approval, see
notes 60-75 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of environmental regulatory
activities, see notes 76-90 infra and accompanying text.
23. Section 51 l(c)(1) of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
provides an exemption from NEPA for most water pollution control activities:
Except for the provisions of federal financial assistance for the purpose of assist-
ing the constructing of publicly owned treatment works. . ., andthe issuance afa
permit. . .for the discharge of any new source..., no action of the Administra-
tor taken pursuant to the Act shall be deemed a major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . ...
33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added). See notes 76-90 and 176-85 infra and
accompanying text.
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latory activities.24 These cases did not consider the 1972 and 1977
Water Act Amendments 25 or the issue of joint federal-state activi-
ties. Thus, the applicability of NEPA to state-issued NPDES per-
mits26 is a unique hybrid issue involving both a joint federal-state
activity and an environmental regulatory activity.
Recently, a federal district court held that a state's issuance of
an NPDES permit was a state and not a federal action.27 This
Note proposes an alternative view. Relying on the policy under-
lying NEPA and an expansive reading of its terms, 28 the Note
argues that the existence of federal control, whether or not exer-
cised, is sufficient federal involvement to constitute a major fed-
eral action.29 Thus, in the NPDES context, EPA's discretionary
power to object to the issuance of permits by a state gives rise to a
sufficient federal nexus to make such issuances federal actions.
Second, this Note discusses the problems arising from implied
and express exemptions from NEPA for environmental regulatory
activities.3" It concludes that whether NEPA should be applied to
permits ultimately depends on the federal-state character of such
permits as gleaned from the 1972 and 1977 amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. After concluding that, con-
trary to decided cases, the language and legislative history give
rise to no clear indication of the federal-state character of
state-issued NPDES permits,3 the Note proposes that any ambi-
guity be decided in favor of the federal character of state permits
in light of the pervasive policies of NEPA.32 Thus, this Note con-
cludes that environmental impact statements are required before
the issuance of NPDES permits by the states.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. For a discussion of the 1972 amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.), see notes 107-33 infra and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the 1977 amendments, see notes 165-75 infra and accompanying text
(Clean Water Act of 1977), Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified in scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C.A.).
26. This Note will use the term permit to refer to the entire process involved in issuing
a permit and not only the permit itself.
27. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 453 F.
Supp. 122, 126 (E.D. Va. 1978). The facts of this case are set out at note 19 supra.
28. See notes 33-47 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 48-75 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 76-90 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 91-175 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 186-201 infra and accompanying text.
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I. NEPA AND "MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION"
A. "To the Fullest Extent Possible"
Section 102 of NEPA states that "Congress authorizes and di-
rects that, to the fullest extent possible ... the policies, regula-
tions, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter. . . ,3I Much emphasis has been placed on the words
"to the fullest extent possible." In reference to this phrase, the
conference report on NEPA stresses that federal agencies are re-
quired to comply with NEPA "unless existing law. . . expressly
prohibits or makes full compliance. . . impossible."34 In addi-
tion, the conference report expresses the intent that this phrase
"should not be used as a means of avoiding compliance" and that
"no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its
existing statutory authority to avoid compliance."35 Thus, the leg-
islative history indicates that the phrase "to the fullest extent pos-
sible" directs both the courts and agencies promulgating NEPA
regulations to interpret NEPA broadly.
Guidelines promulgated by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), which has the authority to promulgate general
NEPA regulations,36 echo this mandate for a broad interpretation
of NEPA. Indeed, the directing phrase "to the fullest extent possi-
ble" appears in the introductory sections of the guidelines.37
Courts have also keyed in on this phrase. One court declared that
the phrase evidences that NEPA is a "value judgment by Con-
gress" that "Americans must, beginning now, act 'as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations.' "38 The seminal case of
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC3 9 found that
NEPA's procedural provisions, including the mandate to comply
"to the fullest extent possible," were "not highly flexible. . . [but
established] a strict standard of compliance."'  The court in Cal-
vert Cliffs' stressed that the language of the Act did not "provide
an escape hatch for footdragging agencies," that the procedural
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
34. CONF. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2767, 2770.
35. Id
36. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 105 (1972).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1977).
38. Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
39. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
40. Id at 1112. These procedural provisions also include EIS preparation.
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requirements were not discretionary, and that NEPA was not in-
tended to be a "paper tiger."'"
Following this theme, courts have construed NEPA exemp-
tions narrowly. In Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Com-
mittee v. Lynn,42 the court held that a NEPA exemption enacted
in the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974,43 which relieved HUD
from preparing an EIS regarding its actions in disaster relief,
would not be applied retroactively." Similarly, the court in Amer-
ican Smelting and Refining Co. v. Federal Power Commission,45
held that an agency could avoid NEPA compliance only after
making express findings that demonstrated the "statutory conflict
which prohibits compliance. 46
Thus, in considering the legislative history, the administrative
regulations, and the case law, it appears that the phrase "to the
fullest extent possible" mandates that NEPA be construed as
broadly as possible in all contexts.47
B. 'Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the Quality of
the Human Environment"
CEQ guidelines indicate the type of actions covered by NEPA
and the characteristics of a major federal action. These regula-
tions state that the Act applies to projects or programs that are (1)
directly undertaken by a federal agency; (2) supported by federal
funding (except revenue sharing); or (3) involve a federal lease,
permit, license or other entitlement for use.48 The guidelines also
establish three indices which help identify a "major federal ac-
41. Id at 1114.
42. 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 5175 (1976).
44. 541 F.2d at 818.
45. 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46. Id at 948.
47. But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court upheld an
Atomic Energy Commission license to operate a power plant. The respondent, an environ-
mental group, challenged the license on the ground that procedures adopted by the AEC
did not conform to the policies of NEPA. Id at 548. The Court rejected such a broad
application of NEPA, stating, "We have before observed that 'NEPA does not repeal by
implication any other statute.'. . . [I]t is clear NEPA cannot serve as the basis for a sub-
stantial revision of the carefully constructed procedural specifications of the APA." Id In
addition, the Court curtailed the scope ofjudicial review and adopted a stance of extreme
deference to administrative agencies. Id at 555. Yet, Vermont Yankee does not hinder the
pervasive range and effect of NEPA policies. See Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont
Yankee: EnvironmentalLaw Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979). See also notes
186-200 infra and accompanying text.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(2) (1977).
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tion." Two indices are general administrative guides. Under the
first index, activities must be considered in light of their overall
cumulative impact. This requires an agency to view its own activ-
ities broadly when deciding whether an EIS is required.49 The
second index requires that "in all cases" in which the proposed
action is "likely to be highly controversial" an EIS must be pre-
pared.50
According to the third index, actions are "federal" if the fed-
eral government exercises "sufficient federal control and responsi-
bility."'" This index requires a federal nexus to the activity in
question. Many cases have restated this requirement. In one such
case, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman,52 the court determined
that, regarding joint federal-state activities, there was "some point
[at which] the nexus will become so close, and the projects so in-
tertwined, that they will require joint NEPA evaluation. '53 Other
cases have described this requirement as mandating that an EIS
be prepared for those activities that have a "federal character." 54
49. Id § 1500.6(a).
50. Id The meaning of this requirement is not clear. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (HanlyI), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), the court stated that
the term controversial refers to cases where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature
or effect of the major federal action rather than the existence of opposition to a use, the
effect of which is relatively undisputed. 471 F.2d at 830. It reasoned that to make the
threshold determination rest on the likelihood of a court challenge would have the effect of
placing the determination of federal action status in the hands of the opponents to the
activity in question. Id at 830 n.9A; accord, Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.
1973), where the court stated: "We reject, however, the suggestion that 'controversial' must
necessarily be equated with opposition."
Yet, the Hanly II dissent and commentators argued for a different, perhaps less
strained reading of this requirement-that "controversial" refers to actions which are al-
most certain to evoke a challenge in the courts. 471 F.2d at 839 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting);
see, e.g., Note, Environmental Law- Rucker v. Willis: Are Impact Statements for Private
Projects that Require Federal Permits an Endangered Species?, 52 N.C. L. REv. 654, 667
(1974). The dissent contended that CEQ may have believed that to avoid "the delay inci-
dent to such a suit. . . the agency would do better to prepare an impact statement in the
first instance." Id (Friendly, CJ., dissenting). Inclusion of the words "likely" and "high-
ly" in the regulation indicate a limitation which would alleviate the fear of spurious major
federal action determinations. Id at 839 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting). In addition, to con-
strue the controversiallty requirement as the Hanoy II majority did unnecessarily limits the
CEQ guidelines, and undercuts the policy of encouraging the use of impact statements.
See Note, supra at 667.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1977).
52. 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. Id at 329.
54. No East-West Highway Comm., Inc. v. Whittaker, 403 F. Supp. 260, 275 (D.N.H.
1975) (a highway, although far from completed, required an EIS when built with the assist-
ance of the Federal Works and Highways Administration).
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There have also been extensions of this requirement.5 5 For
example, while many courts have found that "major" refers to the
environmental impact requirement and "federal" refers to the
federal involvement criterion,5 6 other courts have combined the
two concepts. 57 Under the latter view, the nature and extent of
federal involvement has been examined in the federal character
inquiry," implying that the term "major" modifies "federal" as
well as "action." Some commentators have even suggested a slid-
ing scale between environmental impacts and federal involve-
ment. This approach would result in major federal action
classification for projects with minor impact but substantial fed-
eral involvement as well as projects with significant impact but
minimal federal involvement.5 9
Another approach to the federal control requirement has sig-
nificant importance to the question of the applicability of NEPA
to state-issued NPDES permits. This broad test finds federal
character when there is the opportunity for federal control, regard-
less of whether that control is exercised. The CEQ control re-
quirement as developed by case law may be summarized as
follows: "The distinguishing feature of 'federal' involvement is
the ability to influence or control the outcome in material aspects.
The EIS process is supposed to inform the decision-maker. This
presupposes he has judgment to exercise. Cases finding 'federal'
action emphasize authority to exercise discretion over the out-
come."
60
Courts have developed rationales which have extended this
"authority to exercise discretion" concept of federal control. In
Davis v. Morton,61 the court found that NEPA applied to situa-
55. Perhaps the furthest extension proposed was that NEPA should apply to general
revenue sharing. Note, The Application of Federal Environmental Standards to the General
Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and Unrestricted Federal Grants, 60 VA. L. REV. 119,
121-23 (1974). Contra, Note, General Revenue Sharing, NEPA, and the Bureaucratic Paper
Shuffle Must the Federal Government Prepare Environmental Impact Statements Prior to
Local Spending Decisions?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 797 (1975).
56. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 7 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 20225 (D.D.C. 1977),
for example, the court stated that "where federal action is not in the form of funding or
direct participation, courts frequently look to the significance of the environmental impact
to determine whether the federal action constitutes a major federal action." Id at 20230
n.17.
57. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (an EIS
was required for the cancellation of a contract to purchase irreplaceable helium).
58. Id at 656.
59. Eg., Comment, supra note 7, at 134.
60. W. RODGERS, supra note 4, § 7.6 at 736.
61. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
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tions where the only federal involvement was federal approval of
a program. In Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v.
Atomic Energy Commission,6" which involved a challenge to the
issuance of a license to operate a nuclear power plant, the court
found that there was federal action "whenever an agency makes a
decision which permits action by other parties which will affect
the quality of the environment."63 Another court, in McLean Gar-
dens Residents Association v. National Capital Planning Commis-
sion,64 found that the role of the National Capital Planning
Commission, a federal agency, in merely advising and consulting
with the D.C. Zoning Commission, a local body, regarding devel-
opment applications was enough to require the preparation of im-
pact statements.6 5 Thus, the requirement for federal control has
been refined to a point where federal approval, permission or ad-
vice gives rise to major federal action status.
Developing this idea further, one federal district court has
found that the existence of theoretical but unexercised federal
control is sufficient to require EIS preparation. In Defenders of
Wildlfe v. Andrus," a citizens' environmental group sought to en-
join the State of Alaska from conducting a wolf kill program on
federal lands because an EIS had not been prepared. The court
stated that:
The fact that defendants [the federal government] are not fund-
ing or directly participating in the wolf kill does not preclude
their action from being a major federal action. A decision by a
federal agency which permits another party, governmental or
private, to take action affecting the environment can constitute
a major federal action .... [D]efendants' failure to prevent
the wolf kill. .. is in substance action which6Rermits ...
hunters to take action affecting the environment.
Thus, agency failure to take action to prevent activities which af-
fect the quality of the environment may itself be considered a fed-
eral action.
62. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
63. Id at 1088. The court held that an EIS was required before the license could be
issued. 1d
64. 2 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 20659 (D.D.C. 1972).
65. Id at 20662. Subsequent to this decision, however, the statutory authority of the
National Capital Planning Commission was changed. In light of this, the D.C. District
Court reversed itself in McLean Gardens Residents Ass'n v. Nat'l Capital Planning
Comm'n, 390 F.2d 165 (D.D.C. 1974), holding that NCPC review of zoning applications
did not require EIS preparation.
66. 7 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 20225 (D.D.C. 1977).
67. Id at 20229 (citations omitted). Cf. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 199-200 (D.D.C. 1972) (SCRAP 1).
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This concept of federal action has direct bearing on the ques-
tion of the applicability of NEPA to a state's issuance of NPDES
permits. Following Defenders it may be argued that EPA's failure
to object to specific state-proposed permits is a similarly sufficient
federal nexus to require EIS preparation for such proposals.
Courts are not unanimous, however, on the question whether
the failure to exercise available federal power is indicative of a
major federal action. In Alaska v. Andrus,68 the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska, in a case involving the
same litigation as Defenders,69 held that the federal government's
decision not to object to the wolf kill did not constitute a major
federal action.7" The court stated that for a decision "which al-
lows others to take action affecting the environment" to constitute
a federal action there must be some affirmative conduct by the
federal government before the other party can act.7 ' The court
found no such affirmative conduct in Alaska.72
At this point, one can only speculate whether courts will fol-
low Defenders or Alaska. While it is clear that under Defenders a
state's issuance of an NPDES permit constitutes a major federal
action, the same result may also follow from Alaska. The Alaska
court found "it a strained chain of logic which turns totally
non-federal action into federal action just because the [federal
government] has the power to regulate the activity."73 In Alaska,
the power to regulate involved only the authority to permit or stop
the wolf kill.74 In contrast, EPA's involvement in the NPDES
permit process entails not only the power to veto the proposed
permit but also the opportunity to comment on that permit and to
provide technical assistance.75 Thus, EPA's decision not to object
to a permit may be only the culmination of a continuous involve-
ment in the permit process. This greater participation by EPA
may provide a court--even one that follows Alaska-with the
68. 429 F. Supp. 958 (D. Alas. 1977).
69. Since the State of Alaska was not a party to the District of Columbia proceeding
(Defenders), the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to that court's decision, issued an order
to the State to halt the wolf kill. The State then challenged that order in the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska. Id at 960-61.
70. Id at 962. See also Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Morton, 506 F.2d 572,
580 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the determination of the federal government not to object
to violations in a federal loan, although it had the right to do so, was not sufficient federal
nexus to find a federal action).
71. 429 F. Supp. at 962.
72. Id at 963.
73. Id
74. Id at 961-62.
75. For a description of EPA's role in the permit process, see note 19 supra.
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federal nexus that would justify a finding that a state's issuance of
an NPDES permit constituted a major federal action.
II. NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY ACTIVITIES
An analysis of NEPA may be moot with respect to discharge
permits, as with all environmental regulatory activities under-
taken by the federal government. NEPA requires a federal
agency to take environmental concerns into account when per-
forming its activities.76 It can be argued, however, that environ-
mental regulatory activities, by their nature, meet this
requirement. Thus, the safeguards in NEPA may not be needed
and could be construed as unnecessary encumbrances on such ac-
tivities, hampering the attainment of effective environmental pro-
tection that is the very goal of NEPA.77
Originally, NEPA regulations promulgated by CEQ exempted
environmental regulatory activities from the procedural require-
ments imposed by the Act.78 This policy was gleaned from the
Act's legislative history79 and was supported by the desire to avoid
needless delay of activities that were already environmentally ori-
ented. 0 In the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, however, Congress modified its exemption policy
by enacting section 51 l(c)(1) which exempted all EPA water pol-
lution control activities except construction grants for publicly
owned treatment plants and issuances of new source NPDES per-
mits by EPA.8 Subsequently, EPA promulgated regulations for
76. See notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
77. See text accompanying notes 81 and 176-85 infra.
78. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971).
79. The announced policy in the legislative materials, called the Muskie-Jackson
Compromise, assured that NEPA, which originated in Senator Jackson's Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs Committee, would not hinder environmental programs under the purview of
Senator Muskie's Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. See 1 ENVIR. L. REV. (ELI)
10127 (1971).
80. See text accompanying notes 81, 176-85 infra.
81. FWPCA § 511(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1976). For the text of this section,
see note 23 supra. Section 511(c)(1) was prompted by Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1971), which held that absent a legislative exemption, discharge permits issued by
the Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976),
were required to comply with NEPA's procedural provisions. This had a detrimental effect
on the revitalized permit program "discovered" by President Nixon, Exec. Order No. 11,
574, 3 C.F.R. 551 (1972). For example, only twenty out of 20,000 proposed permits were
issued in the period between 1970 and 1972. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 156 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY]. To avoid further delay in implementing environmental regulatory ac-
tivities and to negate the effect of Kalur, Congress expressly exempted environmental
regulatory activities from NEPA's requirements. See 118 CONG. REC. 33707, 33713 (1972)
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the preparation of impact statements in the NPDES permit proc-
ess.82  Notably, these regulations did not apply to state-issued
NPDES permits.8 3
Predictably, EPA received many comments on this limitation
to the exception. CEQ, for example, argued that the regulations
would increasingly "extinguish EPA's NEPA responsibilities" as
states gained control of NPDES programs."4 It predicted that
such a scheme "would produce an arbitrary and inequitable pat-
tern of NEPA application" in which NEPA would have disparate
effects on similar programs in different states only because of the
variance in the states' assumption of NPDES responsibility.
85
Additionally, the Council contended, such discrimination was un-
supported by the policies which created the exception, tie., the via-
bility of environmental review for new source permits as a
planning tool to assure effective environmental safeguards.86
Countering these criticisms, EPA supported the limitation of
the section 511 (c)(1) exception on two grounds. First, it believed
that state-issued permits were state, not federal actions and that
therefore NEPA could not apply.87 Second, EPA argued that its
authority to veto a state-issued permit could not be construed as a
(remarks of Senators Buckley and Hart), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at
195, 210. See notes 176-85 infra and accompanying text.
82. 40 C.F.R. § 6 (1977).
83. The regulations stated: "These procedures shall apply only to the issuance of a
new source NPDES permit by EPA and not to the issuance of a new source NPDES permit
from any State which has an approved NPDES program in accordance with Section 402(b)
. Id § 6.904(a).
84. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 19, at 35.
85. Id
86. The CEQ position was summarized in a letter written by Russell Peterson, the
Chairman of the Council, to Russell Train, EPA Administrator, in response to the pro-
posed NPDES EIS regulations:
Sound public policy supports using NEPA in all aspects of EPA's new source
permit program. The NPDES new source permit is intended to be a preconstruc-
tion permit. . . . While it is a water quality permit, the environmental effects of
its approval or denial can be far-reaching. . . . It was in recognition of the need
to broaden the focus of decisionmaking in these cases beyond water quality that
Congress specifically required EPA to apply NEPA to the new source permit pro-
gram. Those reasons are equally valid whether it is EPA or the state which is
issuing the permit.
In such circumstances the environmental impact statement performs its most
useful function. Because the new source approval is a preconstruction permit,
there is time for environmental review and there are real alternatives to be looked
at. . . . [T]he NEPA process can help by focusing issues and laying out options.
It gives states and localities a strong informational basis for their determinations
on the design, location, and operation of new facilities.
Id For a discussion of the legislative policies behind § 51 l(c)(1), see notes 176-85 infra
and accompanying text.
87. 42 Fed. Reg. 2450 (1977).
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permit issuance within the "issuance" language of section
511(c)(1) since, under the 1972 amendments, the Administrator
could not actually issue permits within a state which had assumed
NPDES responsibility. Therefore, EPA concluded, even if its role
in a state permit process could be viewed as a major federal ac-
tion, "the Federal action is not the issuance of a permit to a new
source and therefore section 51 l(c)(1) exempts EPA from the re-
quirement to prepare an environmental impact statement in such
a situation."88
EPA's analysis is flawed in two respects. First, its argument
that state issuance could never be an Administrator's issuance
since the Administrator could not actually issue permits unless he
withdrew approval of the state's program is mooted by the 1977
amendments. Amended section 402(d) now allows the Adminis-
trator to issue new source permits when the proposed state permit
is inadequate.8 9 Second, although EPA established an accurate
test in requiring that state-issued permits fit within the exception
to the section 511 (c)(1) exemption,9" this analysis begs the funda-
mental question of determining the federal-state character of such
permits. For if the issuance of such permits is deemed to be fed-
eral action, then it must logically follow that such permits are is-
sued by the Administrator, since he is the only federal official with
any connection to the NPDES program. Thus, although use of
the broad policy underpinnings of NEPA may be tempered by the
exemptions in section 51 l(c)(1), the question of NEPA applicabil-
ity to state-issued NPDES permits must ultimately depend on the
federal-state character of such permits.
III. THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
Inquiry into the federal-state character of state-issued
NPDES permits requires an examination of the legislative back-
ground of the permit program.
A. NPDES Permits-Section 402
1. Generally
The legislative origin of the NPDES permit program, section
402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,9 ' resulted from
88. Id
89. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d)(4) (1978) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1976).
90. FWPCA § 51 1(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1976). For the text of this section,
see note 23 supra.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
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the clash and ultimate compromise between two conflicting policy
goals: the desire for national uniformity in the administration of
the permit program and the desire to place the responsibility for
environmental protection at the local level. The predominance of
either of these policies over the other as an ultimate manifestation
of legislative intent has direct bearing on the determination of the
federal-state character of state-issued NPDES permits. If the
predominant intention of Congress in developing the NPDES
program was to assure uniformity, it could be argued that even
after federal approval of a state's NPDES program, federal review
procedures for specific 'permits are evidence of a program still
within the confines of federal control. State assumption of
NPDES programs would be considered a mere delegation of fed-
eral authority. This would lead to the conclusion that NPDES
permits represent federal action notwithstanding the governmen-
tal source from which they were issued. Conversely, if the pre-
dominant intention of Congress was to assure local control of
environmental decisionmaking, then one could argue that once
the state assumes NPDES responsibility, the programs are purely
state actions, making NEPA inapplicable.9"
To ascertain which of these policies is predominant is a diffi-
cult task since the Act and the legislative materials are ambiguous.
A strong case has been made that the language of the Act supports
a policy of state autonomy.93 The Act specifically directs the Ad-
ministrator to "suspend the issuance of permits" under a program
administered by EPA, in a state once EPA approves that state's
program.94 Subsequent review by EPA of such permits is discre-
tionary. Even more importantly, the Act declares a policy to
"recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution
92. This is not to contend that Congress in its deliberations necessarily decided to
implement one policy to the exclusion of the other. The final versions of both the 1972 and
1977 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act were the result of the ac-
commodation of both of these policies. This very accommodation is the reason for the
difficulty in ascertaining the federal-state character of state-issued NPDES permits. See
notes 93-133 infra and accompanying text. For the purpose of determining the applicabil-
ity of NEPA, however, one must conclude that these permits are either federal actions or
state actions. Thus, it is necessary to find the predominant intent or policy.
93. See Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1290-92 (5th Cir.
1977). See notes 134-48 infra and accompanying text.
94. FWPCA § 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (1976), provides: "Not later than
ninety days after the date on which a State has submitted a program [later approved by
EPA] . . . , the Administrator shall suspend the issuance of permits [from EPA NPDES
programs] as to those navigable waters subject to such program."
95. Id §§ 402(d)(3), (e), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(d)(3), (e).
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... ,96 Collectively, these factors, may indicate that once EPA
approval is given, EPA's role becomes a minor one, with the state
taking the substantial responsibility and workload. This supports
the concept that state permits represent state and not federal ac-
tion.
The language of the Act, however, also supports the argument
that section 402 manifests a policy of uniformity. The Act re-
quires all permits to be subject to the same terms, conditions, and
requirements, whether they are issued from a federal or state
agency.97 In addition, the Act provides many procedural safe-
guards which demonstrate the pervasiveness of EPA control:
EPA approval of state NPDES programs is conditioned on a
state's ability to demonstrate compliance with all EPA and
FWPCA requirements;98 state programs, once approved, are di-
rected to comply with all NPDES requirements established in the
Act and with EPA guidelines for water quality analyses and re-
ports;99 the Administrator may withdraw his approval of a state
program at any time; too the state is required to transmit each per-
mit application to EPA for its review;' 0 ' and the Administrator
has the ability to block the issuance of any permit to which he
objects.' 2 Thus, it may be effectively argued that through EPA
review and approval procedures of both state programs and per-
mits, EPA retains control of state-issued permits: a manifestation
of the policy of uniformity and an indication of the federal char-
acter of state-issued NPDES permits.
The conflict and resultant ambiguity produced by these poli-
cies is illustrated by the etiology of section 402(d)(2) of the 1972
amendments. 0 3 This section deals with the Administrator's re-
view and veto power over a state's proposed permits. The Senate
bill allowed the Administrator final veto power; his approval was
a condition precedent to issuance."° Such federal control would
96. Id § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
97. Id § 402(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3).
98. Id § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
99. Id § 402(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2).
100. Id § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). Withdrawal is subject to conditions estab-
lished in this section.
101. Id § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1).
102. Id § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2).
103. Id.
104. The Senate proposal provided, "No permit shall issue until the Administrator is
satisfied that the conditions imposed by the State meet the requirements of this Act."
S.2770, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 402(d)(2) (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra
note 81, at 1690.
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support contentions of the primarily federal character of
state-issued permits. The House version, however, greatly under-
cut the pervasiveness of an Administrator's power, making the
Administrator's nonobjection a condition subsequent to approval,
thus placing the burden upon EPA to act to block issuance of ob-
jectionable permits.'05 This view buttresses the state character of
state-issued permits.
The final version of section 402(d)(2) retained the condition
subsequent posture of the House bill but extended the time period
in which EPA could respond.° 6 Although this version-because
of its reduced federal rule-apparently signals a preference for the
concept of state character of state-issued permits in state NPDES
programs which have been approved by EPA, the fact that the
Administrator's veto power was retained may indicate a prefer-
ence for the view that the issuance of these permits constitutes
federal action.
2. The 1972 Amendments
Contrary to decided cases,' 0 7 there is no clear indication of a
preference for state autonomy or uniformity, and consequently,
no indication whether state discharge permits were intended to be
federal or state in character. The conference report on the 1972
amendments discusses the general intent of both the Senate and
House proposals with respect to section 402.108 It indicates that
the Senate bill favored uniformity, emphasizing the Administra-
tor's "delegation" of permit authority to the states and the perva-
siveness of federal overview and control. 0 9 The House measure,
on the other hand, is described as supporting state autonomy, con-
taining certain provisions in which a state is "to administer its
own permit program in lieu of the Administrator's program
....,,110 The conference report fails, however, to describe ade-
105. The House bill stated, "No permit shall issue if the Administrator within sixty
days [after receiving the proposed permit] . . . objects in writing to the issuance of such
permit." H.R. 11876, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 402(d)(2) (1972), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 81, at 893, 1058.
106. Id § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (the time period was extended to ninety
days).
107. See note 81 supra; and Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 453 F.
Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1978). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 134-64 infra and
accompanying text.
108. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 138, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3776, 3816.
109. Id
110. In addition, the House bill, according to the conference report, "required" that the
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quately the nature of the bill reported out of conference, stating
only that: "The Conference substitute is basically the same as the
Senate bill as revised by the House amendment. . . ."
Statements made by opponents of the House and Senate bills
support the conclusions drawn by the conference report. For ex-
ample, Senator Buckley opposed the Senate bill because he felt
that: (1) it was an erosion of the commitment to give the states the
"primary responsibilities and rights. . . to prevent and eliminate
water pollution;" (2) it made the Administrator's role "excessively
broad"; and (3) EPA had continued responsibility after "delega-
tion" of NPDES authority. i 2 Representatives Abzug and Rangel
opposed the House bill because they felt that EPA would have no
control after approving state NPDES programs. The two Repre-
sentatives contended:
Under the bill, once EPA approves a state permit program
..., all federal ties to the program are severed. The state is
not EPA's delegate. Even the policies and requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act ... will not apply to the
state permit program and environmental impact statements
will therefore not be required.13
Yet, these general conclusions regarding the Senate and House
bills are not entirely accurate. Although the House report specifi-
cally declared that "permits granted by states under section 402
are not federal permits-but state permits," and expressed the be-
lief that the Administrator would "suspend" his activities on ap-
proval of a state's program, it also announced that "federal
overview of State permit programs is essential after permit issuing
authority has been delegated . ".".., Similarly, the Senate re-
port does not give as clear an indication of support for uniformity
as intimated by the conference report. While it is true that the
Senate report did emphasize the enforcement role of the Adminis-
trator," I 5 it also discussed the need to "restore the balance of fed-
eral-state effort""' 6 and expected "that the States will play a
Administrator approve a submitted program unless there was inadequate authority to issue
permits. Id at 139-40, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3816.
111. Id at 140, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3817.
112. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3767.
113. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 393 (1972), reprintedin I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 81, at 862.
114. Id at 127, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 81, at 814 (emphasis
added).
115. S. REP. No. 92-434, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3677.
116. Id at 8, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3737.
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major role in the administration of the program."' 1 7
The debates of both Houses are also not helpful in ascertain-
ing the intended nature of state-issued NPDES permits. Probably
the strongest statement for state control came from Representative
Wright during the House debates on the conference bill. Wright
stated that once EPA approved a state's program, the states would
issue permits under state law. He continued:
These would be state, not federal actions and thus, whether for
existing or new sources . . . , such permits would not require
environmental impact statements. The managers expect the
Administrator to use his ...veto authority judiciously; it is
their intent that the act be administered in such a manner that
the ability of the states to control their own permit programs
will be developed and strengthened."
18
Yet, this statement is inconsistent with a statement made by Rep-
resentative Gubser in support of the original House bill, which
was supposedly stronger with respect to state autonomy than the
conference substitute. Gubser maintained that the House bill did
not "abdicate responsibility" of the federal government to the
states "with no strings attached,"' 19 thus indicating an intention
contrary to the strict state autonomy stance taken by Representa-
tive Wright. Representative Gubser pointed out the federal over-
view aspects of the bill and termed the state's assumption of
authority a "delegation."'' 20
There were others who maintained that discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters of the United States was a privilege which
could be granted only by authority of the federal government.' 2'
Still others emphasized the importance of federal control, arguing
that only by assuring uniformity with EPA overview could one
prevent competition between the states for industry, and thus pro-
mote an effective permit system nationwide. 22
Thus, in summary, equally meritorious arguments can be
made for finding legislative intent for either state or federal char-
acter for state issuances of NPDES permits. As illustrated by the
117. Id at 71, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3737.
118. 118 CONG. REC. 33761 (1972), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
81, at 262.
119. Id at 10768-69, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 81, at 663.
120. Id
121. E.g., CONG. REC. 38821 (1971), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
81, at 1035 (remarks of Sen. Cooper).
122. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 10639 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 81, at 517 (remarks of Rep. Harrington).
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etiology of section 402(d)(2),z 3 the enacted version tends to adopt
more of the House language which supports the policy of state
autonomy and the characterization of state permits as state ac-
tions. The argument that state-issued permits are state and not
federal action, making NEPA inapplicable, is directly supported
by specific statements to that effect in the House report, 24 and by
Representatives Wright,' Abzug, and Rangel, 126 as well as by a
policy proclamation to promote state pollution control manage-
ment responsibilities. 2 7 Taken together, these considerations
comprise a potent argument that Congress intended that state
character be accorded state-issued permits.
There are equally cogent arguments supporting the thesis that
Congress intended that state permits be federal actions. The exist-
ence of pervasive EPA overview (although diminished from the
original Senate bill)2 8 coupled with statements made in the
House, 29 Senate,' 30 and conference reports13 ' stressing the impor-
tance of that overview lend credence to this view. The arguments
emphasizing the necessity for uniformity 132 and the per se federal
nature of the issuance of discharge permits as a privilege granted
from the federal government 33 are also supportive. Thus, an
analysis of the legislative history of section 402 of the 1972
amendments is, at best, inconclusive.
3. Case Law
Prior to 1977, there had been a number of cases which have
dealt with the federal-state character of NPDES permit issuances,
although indirectly. Specifically, these cases have concerned
whether EPA's failure to object to state-issued permits is an "Ad-
ministrator's action" reviewable by the U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals pursuant to section 509(b)(1)(F). 134 Unanimously, these
123. See notes 103-106 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
127. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 103-106 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
130. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
134. FWPCA § 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1976), provides, "Review of the Ad-
ministrator's action. . . [i]n issuing or denying any permit under section 402, may be had
by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States .... "
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courts have held that state-issued NPDES permits were state and
not federal actions. Thus, these courts have found that neither the
issuance of such permits by the state nor EPA's nonobjection
could be an "Administrator's issuance."' 35 The basis for these de-
cisions is twofold. First, the courts have found a legislative em-
phasis placing the primary responsibility for the permit program,
as with all environmental regulatory activities, at the local level.
In Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 136 the court declared that the language of
the 1972 amendments suggested that "Congress did not intend the
environmental effort to be subject to a massive federal bureau-
cracy; rather, the states were vested with the primary responsibil-
ity for water quality, triggering the federal enforcement
mechanism only where the states defaulted."'' 37 Second, logically
following from the above, it was believed that state authority to
issue permits was not a delegation of power by the federal govern-
ment. The court in Mianus River Preservation Committee v. Ad-
ministrator, EPA' 3 8 held that there was no such delegation of
federal power and thus no federal character or Administrator's
action. The court reasoned that the power to approve state pro-
grams was not discretionary but was mandated by the Act if all
applicable requirements had been met and, once that occurred,
the Administrator was required to suspend his activity in those
states. 39 It characterized the use of "delegation" terminology in
the legislative history as "passing references" and found them to
be outweighed by specific references to the contrary. 40 In addi-
tion, the court viewed the procedural safeguards of EPA review as
intended merely to maintain minimum standards, and not as evi-
dence of continuing EPA control as "Congress did not intend to
relegate the States to the status of enforcement agents for the ex-
ecutive branch of the federal government." 141 Instead, the court
135. See Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977);
Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, EPA, 541 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1976);
and Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
136. 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
137. Id at 77.
138. 541 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1976).
139. Id at 903-905.
140. Id at 905.
141. Id at 906. The point raised by the Mianus court, that federal overview proce-
dures were instituted to assure compliance with minimum standards, is essentially that
court's rationalization of the accommodation of conflicting policies. See note 92 supra.
Yet, this adds nothing to the analysis. The real question that remains unanswered is the
degree of federal involvement Congress thought necessary. To say federal involvement is
intended only to maintain minimum standards says nothing of the pervasiveness of such
involvement to attain compliance with those standards.
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concluded that Congress had invited the states to enact even more
stringent environmental controls.'
42
Underlying both of these-points was an emphasis of that part
of the legislative history which supported state autonomy. 143 For
example, the Mianus court described the discretionary nature of
the Administrator's review power, 44 and concluded from this that
"Congress intended that the Administrator should more often
than not take the 'action'. . . . '41 Further, Mianus cited the re-
marks of Congressman Wright' 46 and the development of section
402(d)(2) 4 7 as support for its ultimate holding. 48
In light of these cases, it would seem that a proper reading of
the 1972 amendments would be one that supported the policy of
state autonomy notwithstanding the otherwise inconclusive and
ambiguous nature of the legislative history.
At present, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Virginia State
Water Control Board is the only reported case that has directly
decided whether NEPA should apply to a state's issuance of an
NPDES permit.' 49  This case arose when two environmental
groups brought suit on four grounds,15 0 all relating to the alleged
significant environmental impact of the refinery's discharge."'
142. Id For support of this point, the court cited FWPCA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370
(1976), which allows states to set more stringent pollution controls.
143. See text accompanying notes 96-106, 113-14, 118 supra.
144. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
145. 541 F.2d at 907.
146. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 103-106 supra.
148. 541 F.2d at 907.
149. 453 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1978).
150. The four grounds argued by the plaintiffs were: 1) that issuance of such a permit
required an EIS and thus, since one had not been prepared, NEPA had been violated;
2) that total maximum daily pollutant loads had not been calculated for the receiving
water body and therefore the permit could not ensure that such loads would not be ex-
ceeded, a violation of FWPCA § 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1976); 3) that
since the permit record contained no evidence that the permit would ensure compliance
with applicable water quality standards, FWPCA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976), had been
violated; and 4) that since permit procedures as specified by federal and state law had not
been followed, EPA was under a duty to object to the permit. FWPCA § 402(d)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1976). Plaintiffs' Memorandum supra note 19, at 1-2.
151. When the merits of the case were reached in a subsequent decision, the court
acknowledged that there was no doubt that the issuance of the discharge permit would
cause a significant environmental impact. 453 F. Supp. at 124. Testimony at the permit
hearing revealed that the refinery would discharge 445,000 gallons of effluent per day con-
taining, among other pollutants, suspended and dissolved solids, oil and grease, ammonia,
sulfides, phenols and chromium-all either oxygen-depleting or toxic. Plaintiffs' Memo-
randum, supra note 19, at 14. The estuary into which effluent would be discharged was, at
the time of the hearing, at maximum assimilative capacity. Id at 15.
In addition, concerns were raised regarding the location of the refinery and the havoc
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While the court dismissed three non-NEPA claims for lack of ju-
risdiction, it held that it did have jurisdiction over the remaining
issue-whether an EIS was required for a state's issuance of a dis-
charge permit. 5 2 The merits of this issue were decided in a sec-
ond round of litigation.
In that decision, the court concluded that an EIS is not re-
quired when a federal agency fails to take action, even though
some environmental impact will result from that failure to act. 153
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that: (1) EPA's failure
to object was, in effect, an issuance by the Administrator bringing
it within the exception to the NEPA exemption in section
51 l(c)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; 54 and that
(2) there was sufficient federal involvement in the state's issuance
of an NPDES permit to make such an issuance a major federal
action. ' 55 The Chesapeake court summarily dismissed the first ar-
gument by relying on those cases which had held that the Admin-
istrator's decision not to veto a state-issued NPDES permit did
not constitute "Administrator's action" reviewable by a federal
court of appeals pursuant to section 509(b)(1)(F) of the
FWPCA. ' 56 Although these cases were decided in a different con-
text, the court believed that if failure to object to a state-issued
permit did not constitute "Administrator's action," it also could
not constitute issuance of a permit by the Administrator.
In deciding the second issue-whether there was sufficient fed-
eral involvement in the permit process to make the issuance of a
produced by potential oil spills. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service commented that it
believed:
that the construction and operation of a refinery complex in Hampton Roads...
[would] result in a significant contribution to the long term diminution of the
area's fish and wildlife resources and could, in the event of a single major oil spill
under certain available conditions, result in the elimination of a significant shell-
fish industry.
Id In sum, the Director of the Virginia Bureau of Shellfish Sanitation called the placement
of the refinery "the worse possible location for an oil refinery." Id
152. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 1349, 1353-55
(E.D. Va. 1978).
153. 453 F. Supp. at 125. For a discussion of the opposing view, see text accompanying
notes 51-75 supra.
154. 453 F. Supp. at 125.
155. Id at 126-27.
156. For text ofFWPCA § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l)(F), see note 134 supra.
Chesapeake cited Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1291 (5th
Cir. 1977) and Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, EPA, 541 F.2d 899,
909 (2d Cir. 1976), which held as noted above, and Washington v. United States EPA, 573
F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1978), which held that for the purposes of§ 509(b)(1)(F) "objecting
to" did not equal "denying" and therefore, that the Administrator's objection to a state-
issued permit did not constitute "Administrator's action."
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permit a major federal action-the court examined two theories
propounded by the plaintiffs. Under one theory, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the State Board was exercising federal authority since
state discharge permits are issued pursuant to the Refuse Act.'57
The court quickly refuted this argument by pointing out that the
Refuse Act had been superseded by the enactment of the NPDES
program.1
58
The bulk of the court's opinion addressed the plaintiffs' other
theory-that EPA's supervision over the NPDES program was so
pervasive that state issuances of discharge permits were in reality
federal actions.'59 In support of this theory, the plaintiffs pointed
to the intensive federal regulation of the NPDES program and
argued that federal authority to issue permits had been merely
delegated to the states. 60 The court responded by stating that the
"fact that an area is subject to heavy federal regulation does not
transform state actions in that area to federal actions . "6... 161
Relying on the rationale of its earlier opinion, the court found
that federal requirements for state NPDES permits were irrele-
vant for NEPA purposes since such permits are "basically state
matters, which are merely subject to minimum federal require-
ments."' 62 The earlier opinion was based on the same cases
which the court later relied on for its conclusion that failure to
object was not an issuance.' 63
The court resolved the delegation issue by examining the legis-
lative intent of the FWPCA, quoting from the conference report
on the 1977 amendments. The report emphasized that section 402
"provides for state programs which function in lieu of the federal
program and does not involve a delegation of authority.'
' 64
Chesapeake is notable for two reasons. First, the court, in bol-
157. 453 F. Supp. at 127 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976)).
158. 453 F. Supp. at 127.
159. Id at 125.
160. Id at 125-26.
161. Id at 126.
162. Id
163. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. at 1353. Specifi-
cally, this opinion used two cases in its analysis: Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of
EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977), and Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administra-
tor, EPA, 541 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1976). For a discussion of these cases, see text accompany-
ing notes 134-48 infra.
164. 453 F. Supp. at 126 (quoting H. CONF. REP. No. 95-830,95th Cong., Ist Sess. 104,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4424, 4479). The court also discussed
dicta in Mahelona v. Hawaiian Electric Power Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Hawaii 1976).
That court expressed the opinion that "in view of the significant role played by EPA in the
state administration of its own NPDES program ... it appears likely that an EIS would
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stering its reasoning to support its position that state-issued
NPDES were "state matters," relied on the earlier section 509
cases and thus approved of their analysis of section 402 and the
1972 legislative history. As noted above, the legislative history is
subject to alternate interpretations. In addition, the section 509
cases did not consider the 1977 amendments.
A second notable aspect of Chesapeake was the court's analy-
sis of the legislative history of the 1977 Water Act amendments, as
demonstrated by its quotation from the conference report. Al-
though the court's reading of the 1977 amendments and their leg-
islative history is apposite with the conclusions of earlier cases
from the 1972 amendments, a closer scrutiny reveals that, as with
the 1972 legislative history, contrary conclusions may be drawn.
4. The 1977 Amendments
The 1977 amendments 65  encompassed a number of
"midcourse corrections" 66 which Congress determined were nec-
essary to meet national pollution abatement goals set for the early
to middle 1980's.167 Among the changes was a new articulation of
permit policy and a revamping of permit programs in several ar-
eas. Specifically, the new amendments proclaimed: "It is the pol-
icy of Congress that the States manage the construction grant
program under this Act and implement the permit programs
.... "168 Although such a statement may appear to support a
policy of state autonomy, the use of the word "implement" does
not preclude the argument that federal control would still be
maintained. This statement may merely suggest that more states
should take over the immediate administrative responsibilities,
i e., carry on with the delegation process. In addition, the use of
the word "implement" contrasts with the choice of the word
"manage" for construction grants. "Manage" denotes a convey-
ance of more substantive responsibility to the states, making the
insertion of the word "implement" particularly significant.
Among the changes in Title IV of the Act (regarding permits
be required of at least one responsible agency even when the state issues an NPDES permit
in the first instance." Id at 1332 n.6.
165. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 96-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.A. (1978)).
166. S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-12, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4326, 4327-38.
167. FWPCA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (1978) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(1976)).
168. Id
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and licenses) were amendments establishing a permit program to
regulate discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable wa-
ters. 1 69 This new program was modeled after the NPDES pro-
gram and was designed to eventually be administered by the
states, with the federal program to be suspended. 7 ° The confer-
ence report (the same report quoted from in Chesapeake) empha-
sized the similarity of the structure of the two permit programs
and noted:
such a program is one which [is established] under State law
and which functions in lieu of the Federal program. It is not a
delegation of Federal authority. This point has been widely
misunderstood with regard to the permit program under sec-
tion 402 of the Act. That section, after which the Conference
substitute . . . is modeled, also provides for State programs
which function in lieu of the Federal program and does not
involve a delegation of Federal authority."'
Such an interpretation supports the policy of state autonomy and
leaves the interpretations reached by cases subsequent to 1972 in-
tact.
The changes in section 402 itself, however, rebut such a con-
clusion. Among the most important of the changes was the addi-
tion of section 402(d)(4) which allows the Administrator to issue
his own permits after objecting to a state's proposed permit, some-
thing which he could not previously do.'7 2 This change is impor-
tant to the analysis of the applicability of NEPA to NPDES
permits in two ways. First, it undercuts EPA's rationale for limit-
ing the 51 l(c)(1) exemption that state-issued permits could never
be Administrator issuances because the Administrator could not
issue any permits once approval had been given to the state's pro-
gram. 73 Second, it severely weakens the argument that federal
responsibility and authority is substantially diminished and that
independent authority in the state is created upon approval of a
169. Id § 404, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1970)).
170. H.R. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 104, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONrG. & AD. NEws 4424, 4479.
171. Id
172. New section 402(d)(4) provides:
In any case where, after the date of enactment of this paragraph, the Administra-
tor. . . objects to the issuance of a permit, on request of the State, a public hear-
ing shall be held by the Administrator on such objection. Ithe State does not
resubmit such permit revised to meet such objection within 30 days after comple-
tion of the hearing, or, if no hearing is requested within 90 days after the date of
such objection, the Administrator may issue thepermit. . . for such source in ac-
cordance with the guidelines and requirements of this Act.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d)(4) (1978) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1976)) (emphasis added).
173. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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state program. Moreover, it bolsters the argument for uniformity
by increasing the federal government's ability to effectively review
state actions.
The legislative history also supports the latter view. In the re-
port of the Senate conferees, uniformity and equal treatment were
emphasized. Specifically, the report stated that "[e]qual treatment
shall apply not only where EPA is administering the permit sys-
tem but also where an approved State is administering such sys-
tem."' 7 4 In addition, the report indicated dissatisfaction with
EPA's administration of the 1972 amendments. It commented
that the permit program developed from that enactment was char-
acterized by inadequate federal overview. Such inadequacy, the
report explained, could lead to the "creation of 'pollution havens'
... [which] was exactly what the 1972 amendments were
designed to avoid."'' 75
Thus, an examination of section 402 and its legislative history
yields inconclusive results. Although cases subsequent to the 1972
amendments have found the arguments for state autonomy to be
stronger, the 1977 amendments, specifically the changes in section
402 and the policies underlying them, undermine such interpreta-
tions and lend convincing support for interpretations which find a
predominant legislative desire for uniformity.
B. NEPA, NPDES, and Section 511(c) (1)
An examination of the legislative history of section 511(c)(1)
(the section which establishes an exemption from NEPA for most
EPA activities outlined in the FWPCA 76 is instructive in at-
tempting to ascertain the scope of the NPDES permit exception.
If an intention either to include or exclude state permits from
NEPA's purview may be gleaned, the question of the applicability
of NEPA may be settled notwithstanding the ambiguity in section
402 concerning the federal-state character of these permits.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 51 l(c)(1) is not
dispositive. Two important yet contradictory statements, one by
174. S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 73, reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4326, 4398.
175. The report continued:
Lack of a strong EPA oversight of State programs is neither fair to industry nor to
states that are vigorously pursuing the act's requirements. The Committee is con-
cerned that the Agency is not conducting a vigorous overview of State programs
to assure uniformity and consistency of permit requirements and of the enforce-
ment of violation of permit conditions.
Id
176. For the text of section 51 l(c)(1), see note 23 supra.
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Senator Jackson, the other by Senator Muskie, frustrate the search
for a clear solution. Senator Jackson, one of the original sponsors
of NEPA,'77 opposed section 511(c)(1) because of the potential
expansiveness of the exemption and the inadequacy of the excep-
tion. He stated:
[T]he exemption is made virtually unlimited through another
means. No environmental impact statement apparently would
be required for EPA approval of State permit plans. Yet, once
approved, these plans would allow the State to issue per-
mits-presumab even for new source discharges-without fur-
ther Federal review, including NEPA review. Therefore, even
one of two exceptions to the exemption-new source per-
mits-can be folded into the exemption through approval of
state plans. 178
This emphatic statement from such a NEPA expert lends consid-
erable weight to the argument that NEPA does not apply to state
permits.
Senator Muskie's comments, outlining the policies behind the
exception and the exemption, support the opposite position. 179 He
maintained that the purpose of the amendments was "to set rap-
idly in motion an effective water pollution control program."' 180
This could be achieved in two ways. First, by establishing and
adhering to rigid timetables for Administrator activities, reason-
ably immediate implementation would result. To facilitate the
decisions to be made by the Administrator and others, the Act
identified many factors which had to be considered and bal-
anced.' 8 ' In this framework, Senator Muskie concluded, the safe-
guards established by NEPA would hinder the attainment of
effective pollution abatement programs because they would delay
adherence to the timetables.' 2 Additionally, such delay was un-
necessary since many of the factors which the EIS preparation
process would identify for consideration were already required to
be considered by the amendments. Thus, the NEPA exemption
177. Senator Jackson was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs which reported NEPA to the Senate. See note 79 supra.
178. 118 Cong. Rec. 33710 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 81,
at 204 (emphasis added).
179. Id at 33701, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 81, at 182-83.
180. Id
181. Id
182. Id Senator Muskie was concerned that polluters would attempt to use NEPA to
frustrate the Administrator's attempts to implement the FWPCA: "[I]f the . . . analysis
that some courts have found in NEPA were to be superimposed on the decisions of the
Administrator... the owners or operators of sources of pollution.., would use NEPA
to delay the implementation of the Act. ... Id
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was established for most of the Administrator's programs.8 3
The second way to achieve adequate water quality programs
would be to require comprehensive environmental planning for
those activities which would lend themselves to such treatment
without significantly delaying implementation of environmental
controls. Senator Muskie stated that construction grants for pub-
licly owned waste treatment plants and new source permits were
two such activities. s4 With regard to new source permits he ex-
plained:
The Conferees believe that the owner or operator of what is to
be a new source has a degree of flexibility in planning, design,
construction and location that is not available to the owner or
operator of an existing source. The Conferees concluded,
therefore, that it would be both appropriate and useful for the
Administrator to consider the various "alternatives" described
in section 102(2)(c). . . of NEPA in connection with the pro-
posed issuance of a permit to a new source, whereas the Con-
ferees concluded that consideration of "such alternatives" in
connection with the proposed issuance of a permit for existing
sources . . . would not be appropriate and consequently did
not extend the various requirements of NEPA to such per-
mits.IS5
The essence of Senator Muskie's comment is that it is the na-
ture of the activity-that is, whether it could use the NEPA re-
quirements as an effective planning tool-which renders it
susceptible to NEPA, regardless of what level of government ad-
ministers the activity. This supports the concept of the federal
character of state-issued NPDES permits. Since the exception to
the exemption does not distinguish between state and federal per-
mits, all new source permits would be included within the exclu-
sion and thus be susceptible to NEPA review.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
At first glance, the law regarding whether a state-issued
NPDES permit requires an environmental impact statement
seems clear. The only court that has decided this specific issue
and other courts which have decided similar substantive issues in
different contexts have unanimously held that such permits are
state actions, devoid of sufficient federal nexus to require NEPA
compliance. These decisions are based on analyses of the fed-
eral-state character of state NPDES permits gleaned from the his-
183. Id
184. Id
185. Id at 183.
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tory of section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
These courts have concluded that the legislators "clearly" in-
tended to promote the NPDES function of the states and to re-
duce that of the federal government.
186
The arguments presented are not unfounded. The Act an-
nounces a policy of placing the primary responsibility with the
states and requires the federal government to "suspend" its per-
mitting activities in a state once the state's program is approved.
The diminution of the role of federal government is evidenced by
the constraints put on federal overview.8 7 In addition, there are a
number of specific statements in the legislative history denying
any theory of delegation and proclaiming the independent state
character of NPDES programs upon EPA approval of the state
program. 188
Yet, such analyses of section 402 are not conclusive and do not
overwhelmingly counter contrary arguments which maintain that
such permits are federal actions requiring EIS preparation. Sup-
porting this contention is the pervasive pattern of EPA review and
the authority to veto state permit activities after approval of state
programs. 89 The fact that federal overview was strengthened and
emphasized in the 1977 amendments not only bolsters the argu-
ment for the federal character of state-issued NPDES permits, but
also undercuts prior cases holding to the contrary. 190 The legisla-
tive history is also replete with numerous references to the "dele-
gation" of federal authority and passages emphasizing the
importance of vigorous federal overview and national uniformity
as necessary to achieve an effective permit program. 191 Finally,
the theory, raised early in the history of the 1972 amendments,
that permits are granted as privileges from the federal government
promotes the characterization of state NPDES permits as federal
actions. 192
By itself, an analysis of section 402 demonstrates that there is
no clear answer regarding the federal-state character of state
NPDES permits. There are additional factors, however, which
may tip the balance toward finding federal action. Specifically,
186. See notes 134-64 supra and accompanying text.
187. For an example of such a constraint, see FWPCA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(d)(2) (1976), and notes 103-106 supra and accompanying text.
188. See text accompanying notes 110 and 118 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
190. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 109, 112, 114, 119, 122 supra and accompanying text.
192. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
1979]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
one must recall that the inquiry regarding the necessity of prepar-
ing an EIS is, after all, a question of the applicability of NEPA.
Thus, the broad underlying policies of NEPA 93 should be deter-
minative in analyzing whether an EIS is required for state-issued
permits. The combined factors of section 51 1(c)(1), t94 which es-
tablish an exemption from NEPA for most EPA activities out-
lined in the FWPCA, and the similarity in objectives between
NEPA and the FWPCA, that is, concern for effective environ-
mental management, demonstrate a reluctance to apply NEPA's
stringent requirements to environmental regulatory activities.
Yet, these factors do not mitigate against deference to the broad
policies which NEPA establishes: NEPA's clarion call for ade-
quate environmental protection must not be ignored.
Three arguments follow from this premise. First, stemming
from the broad ranging policies contained in NEPA, it has been
established that NEPA must be construed as broadly as possi-
ble.195 As a corollary of this rule, NEPA exemptions must be in-
terpreted narrowly to preserve the Act's broad scope.' 96 This has
direct bearing on the interpretation of section 51 l(c)(1), because
to construe the exemption narrowly the exceptions to the exemp-
tion must be construed broadly in order to make NEPA applica-
ble again. The rationale of the exception established by Senator
Muskie' 97 and echoed by CEQ 98 was that new source permits
were excepted because of their amenability to the process of EIS
analysis. Since no distinction was made between state and federal
permits, the exception must be read to include all permits.
Second, in keeping with NEPA's policy of environmental vigi-
lance, section 511 (c)(1) should not be read to obstruct the attain-
ment of effective environmental safeguards. For if that section is
interpreted to distinguish between state and federal permits, a dis-
tinction not supported by the legislative history,' 99 the issuance of
state permits will escape the EIS review process and thus be sub-
ject to less rigorous safeguards than federal permits. This situa-
tion is not only contrary to the policies of NEPA but also
undermines the policies and reasoning behind the establishment
193. See notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the NEPA exemption provided by this section, see notes 76-90
and 176-85 supra and accompanying text.
195. See text accompanying notes 33-47 supra.
196. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
197. See text accompanying notes 179-85 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 179-85 supra.
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of a national program to eliminate unnecessary and excessive
water pollution discharges.200
Third, and perhaps most important, the policies established in
NEPA should be a guide to interpreting any environmental legis-
lation. This is not to say that NEPA works to "repeal by implica-
tion" environmental statutes, 20' but rather that any ambiguities in
such enactments should be decided in favor of upholding the val-
ues expressed in NEPA. Thus, in the NPDES context, ambigui-
ties in section 402 concerning the federal-state character of
state-issued permits should be resolved in favor of their suscepti-
bility to NEPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Although case law has decided otherwise, when seen within
the framework of NEPA and a congressional desire to maintain
adequate environmental safeguards, the arguments for uniformity
and federal control in the state NPDES permit process should be
given additional weight. These arguments should then give rise to
a mandate that state-issued NPDES permits require an environ-
mental impact statement.
DAVID A. KUTIK
200. For a discussion of NEPA policies, see notes 1-6 supra. For a discussion of the
basic policies behind the NPDES program, see I LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 81, at
156. In a letter to President Nixon from Senator Muskie and EPA Administrator
Ruckleshaus, the reasoning behind NPDES was stated:
Despite the national character of pollution, it has not been dealt with uni-
formly. Varying local revenue capabilities, economic pressures, and citizen inter-
est have often stagnated community and State initiative. To assure equity and
national progress the Federal Government undertook to coordinate and support
the many various efforts to control water pollution.
As the President stated in his 1970 Message on the Environment, "... strict
standards and strict enforcement are nevertheless necessary-not only to assure
compliance, but also in fairness to those who have voluntarily assumed the often
costly burden while their competitors have not. Good neighbors should not be
placed at a competitive disadvantage because of their good neighborliness."
To overcome these existing disparities, the Administration proposed that
"standards be amended to impose precise effluent requirements on all industrial
sources." The enrolled bill has done so.
Further, the Administration established the Refuse Act Permit Program as a
major tool to clean the Nation's waters. The enrolled bill formalizes the Admin-
istration's initiative by mandating a permit program. The legislation establishes
national baselines for classes and categories of industry, and an equitable assess-
ment against all discharges within each class or category.
Id See also FWPCA § 101(a)(l)-(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I)-(3) (1976).
201. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 at 548 (1978). See note 47 supra.
